Is the Social Security Crisis Really as Bad as We Think? by Bagchi, Shantanu
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Is the Social Security Crisis Really as
Bad as We Think?
Shantanu Bagchi
Towson University
August 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56294/
MPRA Paper No. 56294, posted 30. May 2014 03:37 UTC
Is the Social Security Crisis Really as Bad as We Think?∗
Shantanu Bagchi†
May 1, 2014
Abstract
Because they ignore the household-level and macroeconomic adjustments
associated with longevity improvements, the actuarial projections of the So-
cial Security Administration overestimate the Social Security crisis. Using a
general-equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets,
I show that accounting for these adjustments, a significantly smaller decline in
benefits is needed to balance the Social Security budget. Households respond to
the longevity improvements by delaying retirement and Social Security benefit
collection, working more hours, and by also saving more. In general equilib-
rium, these effects lead to a natural expansion of Social Security’s tax base and
generate significant delayed retirement credits, which the actuarial estimates
completely overlook.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, mitigating the effect of longevity improvements on so-
cial insurance programs has been a major policy concern in the developed world.
According to the 1998 World Health Report, 26 countries will have an average life
expectancy at birth of more than 80 years by 2025.1 As is well known, these demo-
graphic developments will significantly worsen the fiscal status of unfunded public
pension systems in these countries. In the U.S., life expectancy at birth is projected
to increase to slightly over 81 years for males, and to roughly 85 years for females by
2075 (Shrestha, 2006). According to the 2011 Social Security Trustees Report, the
current payroll tax rate for the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program is
sufficient to pay only 77% of scheduled benefits in 2036, and only 74% of scheduled
benefits in 2085.
One difficulty with the projections of the Social Security Administration (SSA)
is that they are purely actuarial in nature, and are therefore subject to the Lucas
critique.2 From an actuarial standpoint, it is easy to see that increased longevity
will have a significant effect on future Social Security spendings: households that
expect to live longer will also collect benefits for longer. With unchanged revenues,
the only way to keep Social Security solvent in such a case would be to reduce the
future benefit per retiree. The fact that only 77% and 74% of the scheduled benefits
in 2036 and 2085 will be payable with the current contribution rate, implies that
the benefit per retiree will have to be cut by 23-26% by the end of the century.
However, the story is not so simple from an economic standpoint, because the
improvement in longevity will have additional effects on future Social Security rev-
enues and spendings. First, a higher life expectancy will directly increase labor
supply, because there will be more workers alive at any age, and also because it may
give households an incentive to delay retirement and work more hours. Second, if
households risk out-living their assets, then a higher life expectancy will also induce
higher saving, and therefore stimulate the aggregate capital stock. In general equi-
librium, these effects will lead to a natural expansion of Social Security’s tax base.
Moreover, an important determinant of the level of Social Security benefits paid
to a household is the age at which it starts collecting the benefits. The effect of a
higher life expectancy on future Social Security spendings will also depend on how
the collection decision responds to the longevity improvement. The actuaries of the
SSA use a variety of assumptions about how the household-level and macroeconomic
variables relevant for Social Security will change over time, but they overlook these
endogenous adjustments to the longevity improvement. In their actuarial estimates,
the assumed changes in the relevant household-level and macroeconomic variables
are completely exogenous.
In this paper, I compute the extent by which the SSA’s actuarial projections
1The World Health Reports are published by the World Health Organization.
2See Ljungqvist (2008) for a discussion on the Lucas critique.
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overestimate the negative impact of longevity improvements on the fiscal status of
Social Security. To do this, I construct an overlapping-generations macroeconomic
model with heterogeneous households, mortality risk, incomplete markets, and a
realistic social security program. In the model, Social Security provides partial
insurance against mortality risk, and also against an unfavorable labor productivity
shock. Households in the model face a progressive labor income tax schedule similar
to the U.S., and they are also allowed to choose when to start collecting Social
Security benefits. Factor markets in the model are competitive, firms maximize
profit, and the government provides public goods and Social Security. I calibrate
this model to match some key features of the U.S. economy, such as overall capital
accumulation, pattern of labor supply over the life cycle (both with respect to labor
force participation and hours per week), the income distribution, and the share of
government expenditures in GDP.
Using this calibrated model, I examine how a singular improvement in life ex-
pectancy affects the budget-balancing level of Social Security benefits. First, I
compute a partial-equilibrium experiment that replicates the actuarial methodology
used by the SSA: I hold all the household-level and macroeconomic variables fixed
at the baseline level, and incorporate a longevity improvement consistent with the
SSA’ projection. I find that Social Security benefits decline by about 23% under
this experiment, which is very close to the decline estimated by the SSA. Then,
I compute a general-equilibrium experiment in which all the household-level and
macroeconomic variables adjust to the longevity improvement. I find that the per-
centage decline in the benefits required to keep Social Security solvent is significantly
smaller in this case. For households that do not delay benefit collection, benefits
decline by at most 15%, which is only two-thirds of the decline needed to balance the
budget when these adjustments are not accounted for (23%). For households that
delay collection, I find that the delayed retirement credit (associated with delaying
collection beyond the normal retirement age) increases Social Security benefits by
as much as 32%. Therefore, using a model that satisfies the Lucas critique, I show
that the Social Security crisis in the U.S. may not be as bad as we think.
In the current model, a higher life expectancy leads to a natural expansion of
Social Security’s tax base through its effect on aggregate labor supply, and also on
the wage rate. I find that in general equilibrium, labor supply increases by 9.2%
from the baseline, both because workers survive for longer, and also because they
delay retirement by about two years on the average, and work about 90 minutes
more per week averaged over the life cycle. Capital stock also increases (by about
21%) as households save more, both because they supply more labor and therefore
earn higher income, and also because they have to smooth consumption over a longer
expected lifespan. Together, these changes lead to a 3.7% increase in the equilibrium
wage rate. Given that Social Security’s tax base is simply the product of the wage
rate and labor supply, these constitute a roughly 13% expansion in the future Social
Security revenues. Once this expansion is accounted for, budget balancing requires
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Social Security benefits to decline by a significantly smaller percentage. Moreover,
households delay Social Security benefit collection by as much as two-and-a-half
years on the average, which generates significant delayed retirement credits. I find
that for some households, these credits are large enough to actually increase Social
Security benefits from the baseline level.
The critical point of this paper is that the household-level responses to the
longevity improvement have an important effect on the level of Social Security ben-
efits. However, in a general equilibrium environment such as this, these household-
level responses are themselves, in turn, determined by the level of Social Security
benefits. Specifically, the longevity improvement affects household behavior through
two separate channels: a primary channel, which captures the ceteris paribus effect
of the longevity improvement itself, and also a secondary channel, which captures
the negative effect of the longevity improvement on the Social Security benefits. To
separate these two effects, I also compute a partial-equilibrium experiment where
I hold all the macroeconomic variables (including Social Security benefits) fixed at
the baseline, and incorporate the longevity improvement. I find that under this
experiment, households respond by retiring earlier (by about a year-and-a-half on
the average), but also by slightly increasing their weekly hours during their peak
productivity years. Because this leads to a slight reduction in overall labor supply,
life-cycle motives encourage households to save considerably more. Therefore, the
findings from this experiment suggest that the household-level responses observed
in general equilibrium are largely governed by the negative effect of the longevity
improvement on Social Security benefits, rather than the longevity improvement
itself.
Finally, I compute another general-equilibrium experiment in which I also ac-
count for the future improvements in health that are likely to accompany the im-
provements in longevity. To approximate this, I assume that labor productivity de-
clines less rapidly with age under the longevity improvement. I find that accounting
for the health improvements has almost no additional effects on the macroeconomic
aggregates. Aggregate labor supply increases by 9.4%, and the wage rate increases
by 3.4%, so the combined effect on Social Security’s tax base is almost identical
in this case. However, the health improvements cause households to further delay
collection of Social Security benefits, relative to when they are not accounted for.
The average delay in collection in this case is about three years, compare to two-
and-a-half years when the health improvements are ignored. The delayed retirement
credit leads to Social Security benefits declining by at most 11% under this exper-
iment, which is only half of the 23% decline estimated using the SSA’s actuarial
methodology.
In terms of the nature of the exercise undertaken, this paper is very similar in
spirit to Chen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (2012), who quantitatively examine the implications
of different expenditure projections, such as those provided by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
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Reform, on the future debt-to-GDP ratio in the U.S. They demonstrate that the
CBO’s projections are likely to underestimate the future debt-to-GDP ratio, as they
ignore the endogenous labor and capital responses to the changes in the marginal
tax rates used in the projections. In this paper, I show that the SSA’s projections
are likely to overestimate the Social Security crisis in the U.S., because they ignore
the very same endogenous responses to the improvements in longevity.
Economists have long emphasized the importance of studying Social Security
reform using models that account for the endogenous general-equilibrium effects of
aggregate shocks in an economy. For example, De Nardi et al. (1999) demonstrate
that the SSA’s projections about the future tax rates required to keep Social Secu-
rity solvent in the U.S. may be overly optimistic, as they overlook the distortions
imposed by those higher tax rates on household behavior. They show that higher
taxes are likely to discourage labor supply and saving, which is likely to have a quan-
titatively important effect on the future income rate of the program. Jeske (2003)
demonstrates that the privatization of Social Security can be beneficial for all fu-
ture generations even in the presence of aggregate shocks, if the general-equilibrium
effects of the privatization are accounted for. He shows that privatization of social
security is likely to increase private saving and therefore the aggregate capital stock,
which would lead to an improvement in welfare large enough to compensate against
even large aggregate shocks. Therefore, the general finding is that the implications
of Social Security reform can be markedly different depending on whether or not the
associated general-equilibrium effects have been accounted for.3 The conclusions of
the current paper have a very similar flavor: the measured extent of the Social Secu-
rity crisis can be markedly different if these general-equilibrium effects are carefully
considered.4
From the perspective of an individual, labor supply over the life-cycle can be
characterized by two margins: the extensive margin or the participation decision,
which determines the fraction of lifetime spent in employment, and the intensive
margin, which determines the hours of work supplied while participating. Both of
these margins have been found to be empirically relevant in an aggregate sense,
and also individually. For example, Wallenius (2009) finds that differences in social
security account for 35-40% of the differences in aggregate hours between the U.S.
and Belgium, France and Germany. Additionally, Prescott et al. (2009) note that
about half of the differences in aggregate hours worked between the U.S. and con-
tinental Europe can be accounted for by the differences in the fraction of lifetime
worked. However, as Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) demonstrate, it is necessary
3Other studies that have used general-equilibrium models to examine alternative proposals to
reform Social Security in the U.S. include Huang et al. (1997), Huggett and Ventura (1999), Conesa
and Garriga (2003, 2008), and Kitao (2012).
4General equilibrium effects have also been found to be quantitatively important in resolving
other macroeconomic questions, such as the non-monotonicity of life-cycle consumption (Bullard
and Feigenbaum, 2007; Feigenbaum, 2008a) and the welfare-improving role of unfunded Social
Security in a fully rational economy (I˙mrohorog˘lu et al., 1995).
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to account for both the intensive and the extensive margins to correctly estimate
the elasticity of labor supply to tax and transfer programs. They show that large
aggregate elasticities are consistent with small micro or life-cycle elasticities if both
the extensive and intensive margins are accounted for.5 Given these facts, in the
current paper I consider a labor supply decision in which both the extensive and
the intensive margins are operative. Households face a fixed cost of labor force par-
ticipation, and during every period of employment they choose the hours of work.6
This participation cost generates a reservation wage in the current model, because
of which the labor supply function is discontinuous in after-tax wages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe in detail
how the SSA measures the fiscal status of Social Security. I introduce the model
in Section 3, and describe the baseline calibration and the results in Sections 4
and 5. In Section 6, I describe the demographic experiment, and also compute the
actuarial estimates of the Social Security crisis from the model. In Sections 7, 8, and
9, I discuss the results of the general-equilibrium experiment, the partial-equilibrium
experiment of a ceteris paribus longevity improvement, and the general-equilibrium
experiment with health improvements respectively. Finally, I conclude in Section
10.
2 The SSA’s methodology
The Social Security Administration annually reports the financial health of the
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust
Funds in the SSA Trustees Report. Actuarial status of the OASDI program is
calculated both in the short-(10 years) and long-range (75 years), using specific
definitions for the program income and cost rates. Also, both the short- and long-
range estimates are presented under three alternative sets of assumptions: low-cost,
intermediate, and high-cost. The intermediate assumptions represent the Board of
Trustees’ best estimate of the future course of the population and the economy,
whereas the low-cost and the high-cost assumptions represent more optimistic and
more pessimistic estimates, respectively. According the 2011 report, non-interest
income in the OASDI program is projected to be sufficient to pay only about 77%
of scheduled benefits in 2036, and 74% of scheduled benefits in 2085 based on the
intermediate assumptions.
The future financial status of the OASDI program depends on several key vari-
ables, such as mortality, average earnings, labor force participation rates, and in-
5Focusing only on the extensive margin of household labor supply, Ortiz (2009) finds that roughly
90% of the differences in the employment-to-population ratio at ages 60-64 across the OECD can
be explained by the differences in the institutional features of social security.
6Cogan (1981) showed that a convenient way to explain the distribution of annual hours of work
around part-time and full-time work is to include a fixed participation cost in an otherwise standard
model.
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flation. In the Trustees’ Report, the SSA makes specific assumptions about how
the values of each of these variables change over time. For example, average life
expectancy at birth in the U.S. is assumed to reach 81.3, 85, and 88.9 years by
2085 under the low-cost, intermediate, and high-cost assumptions. Also, between
2020 and 2085, average nominal U.S. earnings are assumed to grow at the rate of
3.6%, 4%, and 4.4% per annum respectively. Among other factors, these increases in
earnings reflect trend increases of 0.1%, 0.0%, and -0.1% per annum in the average
hours worked in the U.S.
Even though the Trustees Report accounts for how the macroeconomic variables
relevant for Social Security change over time, their assumed changes are completely
exogenous. For example, the labor force participation rate projections of the SSA
reflect the trend effect of increases in life expectancy, higher assumed disability
prevalence rates, and an increasing proportion of males who never marry. Improved
life expectancy will trivially increase the labor force participation rate, simply be-
cause there will be more workers alive at every age. However, if households respond
to the improved life expectancy by working more, then the labor force participation
rate will increase even further. Also, if the households risk out-living their assets,
then a higher life expectancy will also induce higher saving. To measure the com-
bined effect of these changes on the future financial status of Social Security, one
needs an equilibrium model in which all of these adjustments are endogenous.
3 The model
Time is discrete and at each instant a new cohort is born and the oldest cohort dies.
Cohort size grows at the rate of n per annum, maximum lifespan is T , and each
household in a cohort faces an unconditional probability Q(s) of surviving to age s.
Households smooth consumption and labor supply over the life cycle by accu-
mulating a risk-free asset: physical capital. Private annuities markets are closed
by assumption, because of which households are unable to fully insure themselves
against mortality risk.7 This constraint causes deceased households at every age to
leave behind accidental bequests. I assume that the government imposes a confis-
catory tax on these accidental bequests, which is equivalent to assuming that the
government imposes an estate tax of 100%.8
7Assuming closed private annuities markets is standard in this line of literature, and is also
empirically consistent because in reality very few people annuitize. This phenomenon is referred
to as the “non-annuitization” puzzle, because a standard life-cycle model predicts that households
ought to invest exclusively in annuities if they are fairly priced. Explanations behind this puzzle
include existence of pre-annuitized wealth in retirees’ portfolios, actuarially unfair prices, bequest
motives, and uncertain health expenses. See, for example, studies such as Pashchenko (2013), Dushi
and Webb (2004), Mitchell et al. (1999), Lockwood (2012), and Turra and Mitchell (2004).
8How these accidental bequests are handled within the model can have important consequences
for its quantitative predictions. A common assumption in the literature is that these accidental
bequests are evenly distributed back to the surviving population. However, it has been recently
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At each date, surviving households earn labor income if they work, and they also
choose when to start collecting Social Security benefits. Firms operate competitively
and produce output using capital, labor and a constant returns to scale technology.
The government purchases public goods and provides Social Security. The public
goods purchases are funded using the proceeds from the estate tax and also taxes
on capital and labor income, and Social Security is funded through a payroll tax
on labor income. Social Security plays two roles in this model economy: it provides
partial insurance against mortality risk, and also against unfavorable shocks to labor
income.
3.1 Preferences
Households derive utility both from consumption and leisure. A household’s labor
supply decision consists of two components: the extensive margin or the participa-
tion decision (P ), and the intensive margin or the hours of work (h), conditional on
participation. The period utility function is given by
u(c, 1− h, P ) =
{
(cη(1−h)1−η)1−σ
1−σ − θP · P if σ 6= 1
ln
(
cη(1− h)1−η)− θP · P if σ = 1 (1)
where η is the share of consumption, σ is the inverse of intertemporal elasticity, θP
is the fixed cost of labor force participation (measured in utility terms), and P is
the labor force participation status: P = 1 if the household participates, and P = 0
otherwise. Expected lifetime utility from the perspective of a household born at
date t is
U =
T∑
s=0
βsQ(s)u (c(t+ s, t), 1− h(t+ s, t), P (t+ s, t)) (2)
where β is the discount factor. Also, since I normalize the period time endowment
to unity, 0 ≤ h(t+ s, t) ≤ 1.
3.2 Income
Conditional on labor force participation, a household born at date t earns before-
tax wage income y(t + s, t) = h(t + s, t)w(t + s)e(ϕ, s) at age s, where w(t + s) is
the wage rate, and e(ϕ, s) is a labor productivity endowment that depends on age
shown that with this assumption, Social Security fails to provide any insurance against mortality
risk. Caliendo et al. (2014) demonstrate that if one accounts for how Social Security affects the
accidental bequest that households leave (and receive) in equilibrium, then higher mandatory saving
through Social Security crowds out these accidental bequests, and therefore has zero effect on life-
cycle wealth. Moreover, with this assumption, the accidental bequests create an additional layer of
redistribution in the model that does not exist in reality. Because a higher life expectancy increases
saving, it also increases accidental bequests and therefore has a pure income effect on all households
in equilibrium.
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and a productivity shock ϕ. This wage income is subject to two separate taxes:
a progressive labor income tax, and a proportional payroll tax for Social Security.
Following Storesletten et al. (2012) and Karabarbounis (2012), I assume that the
labor income tax function is given by
T (y) = y − (1− τy)y1−τ1 , (3)
where τy < 1 and τ1 > 0. Note that with τ1 = 0, equation (3) reduces to a
proportional tax function with a marginal tax rate of τy. The payroll tax rate for
Social Security is τss. With these specifications, after-tax wage income at age s is
given by
yat(t+ s, t) = y(t+ s, t)− T (y(t+ s, t))− τssy(t+ s, t)
= (1− τy)y(t+ s, t)1−τ1 − τssy(t+ s, t). (4)
A household’s asset holdings at age s earn a risk-free interest rate r, which is subject
to a proportional capital income tax at rate τk. The after-tax interest rate faced by
the household is therefore given by (1− τk)r.
3.3 Social Security
In the model, Social Security provides retirement benefits to households, and the
benefit paid to a particular household depends on several factors. First, the base
benefit amount (also called the Primary Insurance Amount or the PIA) is progres-
sively linked to a measure of past work-life income, called the Average Indexed
Monthly Earnings (AIME). Second, based on the chosen collection date (Tc), the
PIA receives an actuarial adjustment. Households that start collecting earlier than
the normal retirement age (Tn) receive a permanent reduction in their PIA, called
the early retirement penalty, and the households that delay collection beyond the
normal retirement age receive a permanent increase in their PIA, called the delayed
retirement credit. Households can start collecting as early as the early retirement age
(Te), but they must start collecting by the maximum retirement age (Tm). Third, if
a household starts collecting Social Security benefits before the normal retirement
age, then (s)he is subject to an earnings test, which adjusts the PIA downward if the
household’s earnings are higher than a threshold level (e¯). Finally, the government
also adjusts the level of benefits so that the budget for Social Security is balanced.
3.4 A household’s optimization problem
A household born at date t faces the following optimization problem
max
c,h,P,Tc
U =
T∑
s=0
βsQ(s)
[{
c(t+ s, t)η(1− h(t+ s, t))1−η}1−σ
1− σ − θP · P (t+ s, t)
]
(5)
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subject to
c(t+ s, t) + k(t+ s+ 1, t) = (1 + (1− τk)r) k(t+ s, t) + yat(t+ s, t) (6)
yat(t+ s, t) = (1− τy) (h(t+ s, t)w(t+ s)e(ϕ, s))1−τ1
−τssh(t+ s, t)w(t+ s)e(ϕ, s) + Θ(s− Tc)b(t+ s) (7)
0 ≤ h(t+ s, t) ≤ 1 (8)
k(t, t) = k(t+ T + 1, t) = 0 (9)
where
Θ(x) =
{
0 x ≤ 0
1 x > 0
is a step function.
3.5 Technology and factor prices
Output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function with inputs capital
and labor
Y (t) = K(t)αL(t)1−α, (10)
where α is the share of capital in total income. Firms face perfectly competitive
factor markets, which implies
r = MPK − δ = α
[
K(t)
L(t)
]α−1
− δ (11)
w(t) = MPL = (1− α)
[
K(t)
L(t)
]α
(12)
where δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital and w(t) is the wage rate at time
t.
3.6 Aggregation
Let us define the set of productivity shocks at age s as Φ(s), where ϕ ∈ Φ(s). Then,
the aggregate capital stock and labor supply are given by
K(t) =
T∑
s=0
N(t− s)Q(s)
∫
Φ(s)
k(t, t− s− 1;ϕ) dϕ (13)
L(t) =
T∑
s=0
N(t− s)Q(s)
∫
Φ(s)
h(t, t− s;ϕ)e(ϕ, s) dϕ. (14)
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The total value of the accidental bequests by households who die on date t is given
by
B(t) = (1 + r)
[
T∑
s=0
{N(t− s)Q(s)−N(t− s− 1)Q(s+ 1)}
∫
Φ(s)
k(t, t− s− 1;ϕ) dϕ
]
−
T∑
s=0
(N(t− s+ 1)−N(t− s))Q(s)
∫
Φ(s)
k(t+ 1, t− s;ϕ) dϕ. (15)
Note that in a model with mortality risk and population growth, the number of
households between two successive ages changes because of two reasons: only a
fraction of each cohort survives to the following age, and over time cohorts get
successively larger. The first term on the right-hand side of (15) gives the total
assets left behind because of these two reasons. Therefore, to isolate the assets that
are left behind purely because of mortality risk (i.e. by the households that die
between ages s and s + 1), the second term on the right-hand side of (15) reduces
total assets by the part that is attributable only to population growth. In the
absence of population growth, i.e. when N(t−s) = N(t−s−1) = N , (15) collapses
to
B(t) = N × (1 + r)
[
T∑
s=0
{Q(s)−Q(s+ 1)}
∫
Φ(s)
k(t, t− s− 1;ϕ) dϕ
]
(16)
which can be rewritten as
B(t) = N × (1 + r)
[
T∑
s=0
h(s)Q(s)
∫
Φ(s)
k(t, t− s− 1;ϕ) dϕ
]
(17)
where h(s) = − (Q(s+ 1)−Q(s)) /Q(s) is the hazard rate of dying between age s
and s + 1. It is easy to see that the right-hand side of (17) now only contains the
assets left behind by the households that do not survive to the following ages.
The budget-balancing condition for Social Security is given by
τssw(t)L(t) =
T∑
s=0
N(t− s)Q(s)
∫
Φ(s)
Θ(s− Tc;ϕ)b(t− s;ϕ) dϕ. (18)
Finally, the government also adjusts the labor income tax parameter τy and the
capital income tax rate τk such that total tax revenues from labor income, capital
income, and the accidental bequests, are sufficient to finance its expenditures
B(t) + τkrK(t) +
T∑
s=0
N(t− s)Q(s)
∫
Φ(s)
T (y(t, t− s;ϕ)) dϕ = G(t), (19)
where G(t) is the exogenously specified level of government expenditures.
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3.7 Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in the current model is characterized by a collection of
1. cross-sectional consumption allocations {c(t, t− s;ϕ)}Ts=0, labor force partici-
pation decisions {P (t, t− s;ϕ)}Ts=0, and labor hours allocations {h(t, t− s;ϕ)}Ts=0,
2. Social Security benefit collection decisions Tc(ϕ),
3. an aggregate capital stock K(t) and labor L(t),
4. a rate of return r and a wage rate w(t), and
5. Social Security benefits b(t− s;ϕ)
that
1. solves the households’ optimization problems,
2. maximizes the firms’ profits,
3. equilibrates the factor markets, and
4. balances the government’s budgets.
In equilibrium, total expenditure at time t equals consumption plus net investment
plus government purchases, which is equal to the total income earned from capital
and labor at time t.
C(t) +K(t+ 1)− (1− δ)K(t) +G(t) = C(t) + (n+ δ)K(t) +G(t)
= w(t)L(t) + (r + δ)K(t)
= Y (t) (20)
In computing this equilibrium, I set calendar time to t = 0 and I also normalize the
initial newborn cohort size to N(0) = 1.
4 Calibration
4.1 Demographics
I first set the demographic parameters of the model. I assume that households enter
the model at actual age 25, which corresponds to the model age of zero. To get the
baseline survival probabilities, I use Feigenbaum’s (2008a) sextic fit to the mortality
data in Arias (2004), which is given by
lnQ(s) = −0.01943039 + (−3.055× 10−4) s+ (5.998× 10−6) s2
+
(−3.279× 10−6) s3 + (−3.055× 10−8) s4 + (3.188× 10−9) s5
+
(−5.199× 10−11) s6, (21)
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Figure 1: Survival probabilities from Feigenbaum’s (2008a) sextic fit to the mortality data
in Arias (2004).
where s is model age. The 2001 U.S. Life Tables in Arias (2004) are reported up
to actual age 100, so I set the maximum model age to T = 75. I plot the resulting
survivor function in Figure 1. Under these survival probabilities, the model life
expectancy at birth turns out to be 78.6 years, which is slightly higher than the
current projection of 77.9 years by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).9 This divergence is because households in the model survive to age 25 with
certainty (as the model age of zero corresponds to the actual age of 25), whereas in
the real world they survive to age 25 with roughly 98% probability.
I set the population growth rate to n = 1%, which is co sistent with the U.S.
demographic history and also with the literature. This population growth rate,
along with the above survival probabilities, yields an aged-dependency ratio of 29%
in the model, which is slightly higher than the 23% for the U.S. This should not be
surprising, as the working-age population in the U.S. is measured as the population
between ages 20 to 64, but in the model it is measured as the population between
ages 25 to 64.
4.2 Social Security
I calibrate the Social Security program in the model to closely match the U.S. pro-
gram. First, to compute the base Social Security benefit (also known as the Primary
9See http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm.
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Figure 2: Benefit formula in the U.S.
Insurance Amount or PIA), I incorporate the U.S. benefit-earnings rule into the
model. The benefit-earnings rule in the U.S. is a concave (piecewise linear) function
of work-life income. The Social Security Administration measures what is known as
the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) for every covered individual, and
then calculates the PIA as a fraction of the AIME.
Depending on how large or small the AIME for an individual is relative to the
average wage in the economy, there is an adjustment in the fraction of the AIME
replaced by Social Security. For example, in the year 2000, the OASI benefit was
90% of the AIME for the first $531, 32% of the next $2671, and 15% of the remaining
up to the maximum creditable earnings. As shown by Huggett and Ventura (1999),
these dollar amounts come out to be roughly 20%, 124%, and 247% of the average
wage in the economy. These percentage amounts are referred to as the “bend points”
of the benefit rule, and I take them directly to the model. Note that the progressivity
in the benefit rule is captured by the fact that the replacement rate is decreasing in
the AIME (see Figure 2).
Second, I set the early, normal, and the maximum retirement ages in the model
to Te = 37, Tn = 41, and Tm = 45, which correspond to the actual ages of 62, 66, and
70 in the U.S. Based on when a household starts collecting Social Security benefits,
there is a permanent adjustment in the base PIA. There is an early retirement
penalty of 25%, 20%, 13.3%, or 6.7% if collection begins at age 62, 63, 64, or 65
respectively, and there is a delayed retirement credit of 8% for every single year of
14
delaying benefit collection beyond the normal retirement age up to the maximum
retirement age.
Third, households are also subject to an earnings test if they start collecting
benefits before the normal retirement age. In 2008, the earnings threshold was
$13,560, and benefits were reduced by $1 for every $2 of earnings in excess of this
threshold. Relative to the average household income in U.S. in 2008, this earnings
threshold turns out to be about 27%, following which I set e¯ = 0.27. Then, I impose
a tax of 50% to any benefits above this threshold at every age that the household
collects benefits before the normal retirement age.
Finally, I set the payroll tax rate for Social Security to the current full OASI
rate of τss = 10.6%.
4.3 Labor productivity endowment
To calibrate the labor income process, I assume that the productivity endowment
at age s can be multiplicatively decomposed into a deterministic age-dependent
component (s), and a stochastic productivity shock ϕ as follows:
e(ϕ, s) = ϕ(s). (22)
I parameterize the age-dependent component (s) using hourly earnings data from
Hansen (1993). However, as it is well-known, productivity measured from wage data
suffers from sample selection bias, especially at the later ages when a large number
of households begin to retire. For this reason, I fit a quartic polynomial to the log
of the efficiency data in Hansen (1993) only for ages 25-65, which gives
ln (s) = −3.273× 10−5 + (3.7484× 10−2) s+ (−1.7541× 10−3) s2
+
(
3.4625× 10−5) s3 + (−2.7949× 10−7) s4 (23)
where s is model age and s ≤ 40. Beyond actual age 65 (i.e. for s > 40), I use the
following quadratic function
ln (s) = −f0 − f1s− 0.01s2 (24)
and parameterize f0 and f1 such that (s) is continuous and once differentiable
at age s = 40.10 The resulting age-dependent component of labor productivity is
plotted in Figure 3.
To calibrate the distribution of the stochastic productivity shock, further as-
sumptions are needed regarding how and when this shock is realized. Broadly
speaking, there are two alternative ways of modeling labor productivity shocks in
the literature. In the “permanent” specification, the shocks are realized before an
agent enters the model (ex-ante), and they are preserved perfectly over the life cy-
cle (Zhao, 2014). Alternatively, in the “idiosyncratic” specification, the shocks are
10The values that satisfy these conditions are f0 = 15.4789 and f1 = −0.7918.
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Figure 3: The age-dependent component of labor productivity estimated from Hansen
(1993).
realized after the agent enters the model (ex-post), and they may or may not be pre-
served over time.11 The key difference between these two specifications is that in the
ex-ante and permanent case, households accumulate wealth due to purely life-cycle
motives, whereas in the ex-post and idiosyncratic case, there are also precautionary
motives at work.
The choice between these two alternative specifications for the productivity shock
essentially depends on the frequency of consumption smoothing relevant for the ques-
tion at hand. While the ex-post specification is more suitable for studying intertem-
poral allocation at medium (year to year or across the busin ss cycle) or low (across
the working life) frequencies, the ex-ante specification is sufficient in the current
context. This is because in an environment without borrowing constraints, Social
Security matters for consumption smoothing only at a very low frequency: across
the working and retirement phases of the life cycle. While precautionary saving
motives have been important in explaining the empirical phenomenon of consump-
tion expenditures tracking income (Nagatani, 1972; Skinner, 1988; Gourinchas and
Parker, 2002; Feigenbaum, 2008b), and also generating realistic wealth distributions
from life-cycle consumption models (Hubbard and Judd, 1987; Huggett, 1996), it has
been shown that even in a model with borrowing constraints, the manner in which
11See, for example, studies such as I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (1995), Huggett (1996), and I˙mrohorog˘lu
and Kitao (2009).
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Figure 4: The distribution of the stochastic productivity shock.
the labor productivity shocks are modeled has little effect on the macroeconomic
and distributional effects of Social Security (Huggett and Ventura, 1995, 1999).
I assume that the stochastic productivity shock is realized before the households
enter the model and is permanent in nature, i.e. Φ(s) = Φ(0) ∀s and
Prob
(
ϕ′ = ϕj | ϕ = ϕi
)
=
{
1 if i = j
0 if i 6= j (25)
To calibrate its distribution, I follow Zhao (2014) and assume that lnϕ ∼ N (0, σ2ϕ),
and then set σ2ϕ = 0.45, which is the variance of log male annual wages in Heathcote
et al. (2010). Also, I use Gaussian quadrature to transform the continuous distribu-
tion into a 5-point discrete distribution for computational convenience (see Figure
4).
4.4 Tax function
With the assumed income tax function in (3), after-tax labor income is log-linear in
before-tax labor income. To estimate the parameters of this tax function, I take the
2012 tax rate schedule for a single filer in the U.S., compute the after-tax income
for each level of pre-tax income, and finally regress the log of after-tax income on
the log of before-tax income. This yields the following estimate for the parameter
τ1, which controls the progressivity of the tax code:
τˆ1 = 0.06411. (26)
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Figure 5: The labor income tax schedule.
I plot the estimated tax function along with the U.S. schedule in Figure 5.
4.5 Technology
The historically observed value of capital’s share in total income in U.S. ranges
between 30-40%, so I set α = 0.35. Also, following Stokey and Rebelo (1995), I set
the depreciation rate to δ = 0.06.
4.6 Unobservable parameters
Once all the observable parameters have been assigned empirically reasonable values,
I jointly calibrate the remaining unobservable parameters of the model to match
certain macroeconomic targets. First, so that overall wealth accumulation in the
model matches the U.S. economy, I target an equilibrium capital-output ratio of 3.0.
Second, two salient features of cross-sectional labor supply data in the U.S. are (i)
a rapid decline in the labor force participation rate from about 90% to almost 30%
between ages 55 to 70, and (ii) an average of 34 hours per week spent on market
work between ages 25 to 55. I adopt both of these empirical facts as targets. Finally,
to pin down the tax parameters τy and τk, I assume that τy = τk and target a share
of government expenditures in GDP of 15%.
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σ β η τy(= τk) θP
4 0.9866 0.295 0.176 0.15
Table 1: Unobservable parameter values under the baseline calibration.
Target Model
Capital-output ratio 3.0 2.98
Avg. hours of market work per week between
ages 25-55
34 32.7
Share of govt. expenditures in GDP 0.15 0.16
Table 2: Model performance under the baseline calibration.
5 Baseline results
The unobservable parameter values under which the baseline equilibrium reasonably
matches the above targets are reported in Table 1. Note that with leisure in period
utility, the relevant inverse elasticity for consumption is σc = 1 + η(σ − 1) = 1.89,
which lies within the range frequently encountered in the literature. The model-
generated values for the targets under the baseline calibration are reported in Table
2, and the cross-sectional labor force participation and labor hours data (conditional
on participation) are reported in Figures 6 and 7.12 Note that in calculating labor
hours per week, I net out eight hours per day as sleep time.
It is clear from Figures 6 and 7 that the model does a reasonable job of matching
observed labor supply behavior in the U.S., both along the extensive and the inten-
sive margins. As for the extensive margin, the model replicates the rapid decline
in labor force participation between ages 55 and 70 quite well. However, it slightly
overestimates the participation rates prior to age 62, and underestimates the par-
ticipation rates after age 62. This is because of two reasons. First, prior to age 62,
market work is the only source of income for households in the model, whereas in
reality households also receive various forms of assistance from the government that
are not tied to work, such as food stamps and supplemental security income. Due
to this reason, labor force participation rates between ages 30-50 are close to 98%
in the model, whereas in the U.S. they range between 87-90%.
Second, the model underestimates participation rates after age 62 because it
abstracts from illiquid private pension wealth. As French (2005) points out, two
most important determinants of the labor force exit decision are the accrual rates of
illiquid private pension wealth, and the tax disincentives associated with collecting
Social Security benefits before the normal retirement age. In most private pension
plans, there is a formula component that increases pension wealth with age, up to
the normal retirement age (Gustman et al., 2000). This incentive, which delays
12The cross-sectional mean of a variable x(t, t− s;ϕ) is calculated using the formula x¯(t, t− s) =∫
Φ(s)
x(t, t− s;ϕ) dϕ.
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Figure 6: Cross-sectional labor force participation rates under the baseline calibration.
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Figure 7: Cross-sectional mean of labor hours per week (conditional on participation)
under the baseline calibration.
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the labor force exit decision beyond the early retirement age of 62, is absent in the
current model.13
As for the intensive margin of labor supply or the hours per week (conditional on
participation), Figure 7 shows that the baseline hours profile initially increases, but
then declines with age, with more rapid declines between ages 60 and 70. While this
captures the overall pattern of hours over the life cycle observed in the data quite
well, the model hours profile peaks relatively early − at age 35, compared to about
age 45 in the data. This is because the shape of the age-dependent component of
labor productivity (s) is the single-most important determinant of the shape of the
hours profile generated from the model, and the productivity profile estimated from
Hansen (1993) peaks relatively early. While it is standard practice in the literature
to treat the age-dependent component (s) as observable, there are studies that
treat this as an unobservable structural parameter, and calibrate it to match the
shape of the hours profile in the data (Bullard and Feigenbaum, 2007; Bagchi and
Feigenbaum, 2014). As one would expect, the calibrated productivity profiles in
these studies peak significantly later in life (about age 52 or even later), relative to
the productivity profile estimated from Hansen (1993), which peaks at age 42.14
The key factor behind the rapid decline in labor force participation beyond
age 62 is the earnings test associated with working while collecting Social Security
benefits. In Figure 8, I plot the fraction of households collecting Social Security
benefits in the baseline equilibrium as a function of the collection age, along with
the corresponding data from the SSA. Two key facts with respect to Social Security
benefit collection in the U.S. are (i) about 45-47% of households start collecting at
the early retirement age of 62, and (ii) almost 96% start collecting by the normal
retirement age of 66. While the model matches the rapid increase in the number
of households collecting Social Security benefits between ages 62-66, it somewhat
underestimates the fraction of households collecting benefits at the early retirement
age. This number is around 24% in the model, which is about half of that observed
in the data. This is due to the fact that the model abstracts from an important
determinant of the collection decision: the positive correlation between earnings and
life expectancy observed in the U.S. (Waldron, 2005). The expected lifespan at age
62 is identical for poor and wealthy households in the model, but considerably less
for the poorer households in reality. This causes households at the bottom of the
income distribution in the model to delay collection until about age 70, which is
13Another factor that causes labor force participation rates in the baseline model to near zero by
age 70 is the rapid decline in the age-dependent component of labor productivity (s) between ages
65 and 70. In Section 9, I compute an alternative version of the model in which this decline is less
rapid. As one would expect, labor force participation rates in this version of the model decline to
only about 24% by age 70.
14Because of the progressive labor income tax function, average tax rates over the life cycle start
out low, peak roughly when hours peak, and then decline. In the baseline, the peak labor income
tax rate is as low as 2.1% for households at the bottom of the income distribution, and is as high
as 24% for households at the top of the income distribution.
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Figure 8: Cumulative proportion of households collecting Social Security benefits by age
under the baseline calibration.
significantly later than when they start collecting in the real world.15
Finally, the cross-sectional age-consumption profile in the baseline calibration is
reported in Figure 9. It is clear from the figure that consumption in the baseline
equilibrium does not match data (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002) very well. This
should not be surprising, though, as it is well-known that no fully rational model
can replicate the empirical life-cycle consumption profile in Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) in a general equilibrium with Social Security.16 This is because Social Security
reduces private saving and therefore the aggregate capital stock, which leads to
significantly higher interest rates in general equilibrium (which is about 5.7% in the
baseline model and 3.4% in Gourinchas and Parker (2002)). A higher interest rate
causes consumption to increase much more rapidly in early life, because of which
the peaks in life cycle consumption in the model are too large and occur much
later than what is found in data. For example, cross-sectional mean consumption
in the baseline calibration peaks at roughly age 58, with a ratio of peak to initial
consumption of about 1.44. The empirical consumption profile in Gourinchas and
Parker (2002) peaks much earlier roughly at age 50, and is much flatter with a
peak-to-initial consumption ratio of about 1.1.
15See I˙mrohorog˘lu and Kitao (2010) for a general-equilibrium model with health-dependent mor-
tality and Social Security benefit claiming.
16Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007) find a calibration that reasonably matches the empirical con-
sumption profile, but using a model without Social Security.
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Figure 9: Cross-sectional mean of consumption (normalized by consumption at birth)
under the baseline calibration.
6 The longevity improvement
A straightforward way to incorporate a one-time improvement in longevity in the
current model is to reduce the baseline age-specific death rates based on the following
formula:
hn(s) = h(s)− γsν , (27)
where h(s) is the baseline death rate at age s, and γ and ν are parameters that can
be chosen to match a specific life expectancy target. Note that these age-specific
improvements in mortality replicate the fact that old-age survivorship in the U.S.
has increased at a faster rate in the later half of the twentieth century, making the
population survival curve more rectangular (Arias, 2004).
I choose values for γ and ν such that model life expectancy under the augmented
survival probabilities matches the 2011 Trustees Report’s average period life ex-
pectancy projection for the year 2085. The SSA reports the future financial status
of Social Security under three alternative assumptions: low-cost, intermediate, and
high-cost, of which, the intermediate assumptions reflect the SSA’s Trustees’ “best
estimates of future experiences”. To match the projected life expectancy of 85 years
under the intermediate assumptions, I set γ = 1 × 10−5 and ν = 1.8509. The sur-
vivor function corresponding to the new demographic parameters is compared to
that in the baseline calibration in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Baseline and the projected survival probabilities.
Based on the actuarial estimates in the 2011 Social Security Trustees’ Report,
non-interest income in the OASDI program is projected to be sufficient to pay only
75% of scheduled benefits in 2085 under the intermediate assumptions. This implies
that if Social Security benefits and contributions continue to be based on current law,
then by 2085 benefits will have to be reduced by 25% to keep the program solvent.
It is useful to verify to what extent the current model matches this estimate of the
Social Security crisis, if the SSA’s actuarial methodology is applied on the current
model. To do this, I calculate the percentage change in the Social Security benefits
required to balance the program’s budget with the projected survival probabilities,
while holding all the household-level and macroeconomic variables fixed at their
baseline equilibrium values (Case 1).17
It turns out that under Case 1, Social Security benefits in the model need to
decline by about 23% to keep the program solvent with the projected survival prob-
abilities. There is a small increase of 2% in Social Security’s tax base under Case 1,
but this is purely an effect of reduced mortality on the labor force.18 On the other
17It is useful to note here that the baseline steady-state characteristics of the current model are
also very similar to the assumptions used in the SSA’s actuarial estimates. In the SSA’s estimates,
average hours worked are assumed to grow at the rate of 0.0% per annum, and the labor force
participation rate is assumed to be roughly constant. Both of these conditions are satisfied under
Case 1.
18Note from equation (18) that Social Security’s tax base is nothing but the wage rate times
aggregate labor.
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Baseline Case 2
Labor 13.3 14.5
Capital 71.5 86.6
Real interest rate 5.74% 4.97%
Wage 1.17 1.21
Capital-output ratio 2.98 3.19
Table 3: Macroeconomic variables in the initial baseline, and also under Case 2.
hand, if Social Security benefits and contributions continue at their baseline equi-
librium rates, the longevity improvement causes total Social Security expenditures
under Case 1 to increase by 32%. The only way to manage this fiscal imbalance
is to permanently reduce the benefits by 23%. Given that this is very close to the
25% decline estimated by the SSA, we can conclude that the current model does
a good job of matching the SSA’s projections of the Social Security crisis in 2085
using their actuarial methodology.19
7 The general-equilibrium estimates
To examine how accounting for the endogenous household-level and macroeconomic
adjustments to the longevity improvement affect the measured extent of the Social
Security crisis, I incorporate the projected survival probabilities into the baseline
model, but this time compute the budget-balancing change in Social Security ben-
efits (from the baseline) in general equilibrium (Case 2). In Table 3, I report the
equilibrium values of relevant macroeconomic variables, both in the initial baseline
and with the new survival probabilities. It is clear from the table that the improve-
ment in longevity leads to a significant increase in labor supply, aggregate capital
stock, and the wage rate, and a decline in the real interest rate. Note that this
expansion in labor supply consists of adjustments both along the extensive, as well
as the intensive margins. Aggregate output also increases, but the increases in the
capital stock are proportionally larger, because of which the capital-output ratio in-
creases from the baseline. Together, the increase in the wage rate and labor supply
under Case 2 lead to a 13% increase in the size of Social Security’s tax base, which
is significantly larger than the 2% increase under Case 1.
With the SSA’s actuarial methodology, the only factor relevant for the level of
Social Security benefits is how the longevity improvement increases the number of
surviving retirees in the economy. However, when one accounts for the household-
level and macroeconomic adjustments to the longevity improvement, the effect on
Social Security benefits is more complicated. In this case, Social Security benefits
19Note that because the actuarial methodology ignores how households respond to the improve-
ment in longevity, the decline in Social Security benefits is identical for all household types under
Case 1.
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ϕ 0.15 0.40 1 2.48 6.79
Case 1 -23% -23% -23% -23% -23%
Case 2 -14.9% -9.8% 7.5% -13.0% 31.7%
Table 4: Percentage changes in Social Security benefits under Cases 1 and 2 for each
household type.
depend not only on the number of surviving retirees, but also on how the tax base
and the benefit collection decision are affected by the longevity improvement.
In Table 4, I compare the percentage change in Social Security benefits (from
the initial baseline) for each household type under Cases 1 and 2. As the table
shows, there is considerable variation in how the longevity improvement affects the
level of Social Security benefits under Case 2. The largest decline in Social Security
benefits is experienced by the households at the bottom of the income distribution
(ϕ = 0.15): their benefits decline by about 15% from the baseline level, whereas
households at the top of the income distribution (ϕ = 6.79) actually experience an
increase (roughly 32%). However, even the largest decline in benefits under Case 2
(15%) is only two-thirds of the decline under Case 1 (23%). Averaging across all
households at an age when everyone collects benefits, the decline under Case 2 is
only 0.9%, which is even less than a percentage point.
Because the results in Table 4 are jointly determined by the effect of the longevity
improvement on the size of the tax base, and also on the date of benefit collection,
it is useful to try and understand the importance of each mechanism individually.
First, note that the 13% increase in the tax base under Case 2 can be decomposed
into a 9.2% increase in labor supply from the baseline, which includes adjustments
both along the extensive and the intensive margin, and a 3.7% increase in the wage
rate. In Figures 11 and 12, I compare the cross-sectional labor force participation
rates, and the weekly hours (conditional on participation) under Case 2 with those
in the baseline.
First, let us consider the extensive margin of labor supply, or the labor force
participation decision (Figure 11). It is clear from the figure that a large number of
households in the model delay retirement as a result of the longevity improvement.
Households do not begin to exit the labor force until age 61 under Case 2, which
is significantly later than age 55 in the baseline. Also, because the participation
rate drops to almost zero by age 70, the decline in labor force participation is more
rapid in this case. On the average, retirement is delayed by about two years, with
households in the top half of the income distribution experiencing the larger delays.
Second, consider the intensive margin of labor supply, or the hours per week
of market work, conditional on labor force participation (Figure 12). The figure
demonstrates a clear increase in the weekly hours between ages 33-70: on the aver-
age, labor supply increases by about 90 minutes per week over the life cycle. As in
the baseline, we see a rapid decline in hours per week at later ages, but in this case
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Figure 11: Cross-sectional labor force participation rates, baseline and under Case 2.
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Figure 12: Cross-sectional means of hours per week (conditional on participation), baseline
and under Case 2.
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the decline does not begin until age 62. Even though the age-dependent component
of the labor productivity (s) starts to decline after age 42, delayed retirement and
the increased hours per week in this range deliver an overall increase of 9.2% in
labor supply under Case 2.
If the capital stock were fixed at the baseline level, this increase in labor supply
would reduce the equilibrium wage rate by about 3%. Taken together, these changes
would lead to an expansion of only 6% in Social Security’s tax base. However,
capital stock also increases from the baseline, as household saving also responds
to the improved longevity. A ceteris paribus improvement in longevity encourages
households to save more due to life-cycle motives. This effect is weakened when
labor supply responds positively, but the positive income effect from the increased
labor supply encourages further saving. Finally, if a household experiences a decline
in their Social Security benefits, then life-cycle motives encourage them to save even
more. Averaging across all ages, these effects collectively increase the mean cross-
sectional asset holdings by about 16% from the baseline under Case 2. These changes
in asset holdings translate into a 21% increase in the aggregate capital stock, and a
3.7% increase in the equilibrium wage rate. Taking the labor supply and wage rate
adjustments together, Social Security’s tax base increases by roughly 13% under
Case 2.
While the household-level labor supply and saving decisions affect the tax base,
or the income side of Social Security, the decision to start collecting Social Security
benefits affects the expenditure side of the program. On the one hand, delaying
collection reduces the number of retirees who have to be paid Social Security benefits,
but on the other hand, the actuarial adjustment increases the benefit paid to each
retiree who delays collection. To understand the effect of the longevity improvement
on the collection decision, I compare in Figure 13 the fraction of households collecting
Social Security benefits at every age in the baseline with those under Case 2.
It is clear from the figure that a large number of households delay collecting Social
Security benefits with the longevity improvement. The fraction of households who
start collecting at the early retirement age of 62 under Case 2 is roughly identical
to the baseline, but it remains unchanged until after the normal retirement age. At
age 67, only 22% of the households collect Social Security benefits under Case 2,
which is significantly smaller than the 98% in the baseline equilibrium, but after age
67 this fraction increases rapidly and reaches 100% by age 70.20
Decomposing the collection decision by household type, I find that while there
is no effect on the households with ϕ = 0.15 and 2.48, the longevity improvement
delays collection by one, four, and seven years for households with ϕ = 0.40, 1,
and 6.79 respectively. Given this fact, it is not surprising that these households
experience the smallest declines in their Social Security benefits under Case 2 (in
fact, benefits actually increase from the baseline for ϕ = 1 and 6.79). For these
20The response to delay collecting Social Security benefits due to the longevity improvement that
I find here is consistent with I˙mrohorog˘lu and Kitao (2010).
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Figure 13: Fraction of retirees collecting benefits, baseline and under Case 2.
households, the delayed retirement credit associated with delaying collection some-
what compensates for the decline in Social Security benefits, and in some cases even
reverses it.
To summarize, the above experiment demonstrates that in general equilibrium,
the improvement in longevity causes households to delay retirement and work more
hours, save more over the life cycle, and also delay collecting Social Security benefits.
Accounting for all of these responses, the largest decline in Social Security benefits
is only two-thirds of the amount estimated by the SSA.
8 Improved longevity, or shrinking Social Security?
While the above results come from a general-equilibrium model calibrated to the
U.S. economy, it would appear to the casual observer that the model’s predictions
with respect to household behavior are inconsistent with data. In the model, the
longevity improvement causes delayed retirement, increases weekly hours, and also
increases saving. However, historical U.S. time-series data shows that while there
has been a steady improvement in life expectancy in the later half of the twentieth
century (Arias, 2004), old-age labor force participation rates have actually declined
during this period (Fullerton Jr., 1999). Between 1950-1970, there was a small
increase in the overall participation rates between ages 55-64 (from 57% to 62%),
but this was mostly due to the fact that the participation rates for women in this
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age bracket increased rapidly: from 27% in 1950 to 43% in 1970. During this same
period, the overall participation rates for ages 65 and above decreased from 27% to
17%, and continued to decline to about 12% in 1998.21
It turns out that this inconsistency is due to the fact that the experiment defined
under Case 2 is quite different from the U.S. economic experience in the later half
of the twentieth century. In the U.S., this period was characterized by improving
life expectancies, and also by an expansion of Social Security, such as a gradual
increase in the payroll tax from a combined rate of about 5% in 1960, to about
9% in 1980 and 10.6% in 2000, and the introduction of the automatic cost-of-living
adjustments (COLA) starting in 1975. In contrast, in the experiment defined under
Case 2, there are no changes to the institutional features of Social Security, and
only longevity improves. Holding everything else fixed, this longevity improvement
actually makes Social Security less generous relative to the baseline. The general-
equilibrium adjustments identified under Case 2, therefore, capture the effect of the
longevity improvements on household behavior through two different channels: a
primary effect of the longevity improvement itself, and a secondary effect due to
shrinking Social Security benefits.
In this section, I compute a new partial equilibrium experiment to separate these
two effects. In this experiment, I hold the wage rate, the interest rate, and also the
Social Security benefits fixed at the initial baseline level, but allow the households to
respond along the labor supply and saving margins to the improvement in longevity
(Case 3).22 I compare the labor force participation rates, as well as the weekly
hours of work (conditional on participation) under this experiment and the baseline
equilibrium, in Figures 14 and 15 respectively.
As Figure 14 demonstrates, this experiment yields old-age labor force participa-
tion rates that are consistent with the historical trend of labor force participation
in the U.S. Under Case 3, the participation rate in the model declines from 98%
to 77% at age 58, and from 77% to 23% at age 62. However, while labor force
participation declines under this experiment, households’ weekly hours (conditional
on participation) respond positively (see Figure 15). It is clear from the figure that
there is an increase in the weekly hours prior to age 55 under Case 3, and the rapid
decline in labor force participation causes hours to decline much faster at later ages.
Because the increased hours occur at ages during which productivity is relatively
high, overall labor supply declines only marginally − by about a third of a percent-
age point, in spite of the fact that households exit the labor force much earlier under
this experiment.23
21It is useful to note here that while the personal saving rate measured by the National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) ranged at about 8-10% between 1960 and 1980, it declined to almost 0%
by 2000. Lansing (2005) attributes this decline in the NIPA personal saving rates to measurement
errors, such as ignoring capital gains on stock portfolios and real estate, and counting employer
pension contributions as income, even though they are not readily available to households.
22I also hold the benefit collection decisions fixed at their baseline levels in this experiment.
23Because labor supply does not change much, household saving responds much more strongly to
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Figure 14: Cross-sectional labor force participation rates, baseline and under Case 3.
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Figure 15: Cross-sectional means of hours per week (conditional on participation), baseline
and under Case 3.
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Therefore, I find that a ceteris paribus improvement in longevity has a small
negative effect on overall labor supply. Holding Social Security benefits constant
at the baseline level, the longevity improvement by itself causes old-age labor force
participation rates to decline, which matches the historical trend in the U.S. quite
well, and weekly hours increase slightly from the baseline. Taken together, these
findings indicate that it is the shrinking Social Security benefits, rather than the
longevity improvement itself, that cause households to delay retirement under Case
2.
9 Improved longevity and health
While the primary focus of the current paper is to account for the effect of improved
longevity on households’ labor supply and saving decisions, one factor that has been
ignored so far is the possible effect of improved longevity on households’ health.
First, there is considerable evidence that the health of the elderly population in the
U.S. has improved considerably over time (Cutler and Landrum, 2012). Moreover,
Halliday et al. (2009) find that better health allows households to allocate more time
to productive activities, so holding life expectancy constant, households with better
health will supply more labor. Therefore, there is a third reason due to which SSA’s
actuarial projections overestimate the Social Security crisis: they ignore the effect
of longevity improvements on the future health status of the U.S. population.
In this section, I compute a new general-equilibrium experiment where I ap-
proximate the improvement in future health status by changing the age-dependent
component of labor productivity (s) at older ages (Case 4). Specifically, I incorpo-
rate the new survival probabilities into the baseline model, and I assume that beyond
age 65, productivity now declines linearly with age rather than quadratically, given
by
ln (s) = −f0 − f1s. (28)
I parameterize f0 and f1 such that (s) is continuous and once differentiable at
age s = 40.24 I report this new endowment profile in Figure 16, and I compare
the equilibrium values of key macroeconomic variables under this experiment with
the baseline and Case 2 in Table 5. It is clear from the table that accounting
for the health improvements has almost no additional effect on the macroeconomic
variables. Across the baseline and Case 4, wages increase by 3.4% and labor supply
increases by 9.4%, which leads to a roughly 13% increase in Social Security’s tax
base. This expansion is almost identical to that documented under Case 2.
the longevity improvement under Case 3. Averaged across all ages, cross-sectional asset holdings
increase by 37% in this case, compared to only 16% under Case 2. This increase in asset holdings
constitutes an overall increase of 42% in the supply of capital under Case 3, which is twice as large
as the 21% increase in the equilibrium capital stock under Case 2.
24The values that satisfy these conditions are f0 = −0.5211 and f1 = 0.0082.
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Figure 16: The age-dependent component of labor productivity, baseline and under Case
4.
Baseline Case 2 Case 4
Labor 13.3 14.5 14.6
Capital 71.5 86.6 85.5
Real interest rate 5.74% 4.97% 5.02%
Wage 1.17 1.21 1.21
Capital-output ratio 2.98 3.19 3.18
Table 5: Macroeconomic variables in the initial baseline, and under Cases 2 and 4.
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Figure 17: Cross-sectional labor force participation rates, baseline and under Case 4.
Even though accounting for the health improvements generates macroeconomic
aggregates that are almost identical to those under Case 2, there are some differences
in labor supply behavior across the two experiments, both across the extensive and
the intensive margin. As Figure 17 demonstrates, the improvement in longevity
leads to an increase in old-age labor force participation even under Case 4, but
the improvement in health somewhat counteracts it. The participation rate under
this experiment does not begin to decline until age 58, which is later than age 55
under the baseline calibration, but earlier than age 61 under Case 2. Also, the
participation rate declines to near zero by age 69 under Case 2, but accounting for
the health improvement, it declines to only about 24%. This fact is also reflected in
the weekly hours, conditional on participation, under Case 4. Figure 18 shows that
the hours per week are virtually indistinguishable between Cases 2 and 4 up to about
age 67, but beyond that hours are slightly higher when the health improvement are
accounted for. However, these differences do not appear to be macroeconomically
significant.
Given that the expansion in Social Security’s tax base under Case 4 is roughly
identical that under Case 2, one would expect the Social Security benefits under
this experiment to respond similarly. To verify this, I report the percentage changes
in the Social Security benefits (from the baseline) under Case 4 in Table 6. The
table shows that the overall pattern of changes in the Social Security benefits under
this experiment is very similar to Case 2: households with ϕ = 0.15, 0.4, and
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Figure 18: Cross-sectional means of hours per week (conditional on participation), baseline
and under Case 4.
ϕ 0.15 0.40 1 2.48 6.79
Case 1 -23% -23% -23% -23% -23%
Case 2 -14.9% -9.8% 7.5% -13.0% 31.7%
Case 4 -11.3% -3.7% 9.7% -11.7% 32.3%
Table 6: Percentage changes in Social Security benefits under Cases 1, 2, and 4 for each
household type.
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Figure 19: Cumulative proportion of households collecting Social Security benefits by age
in the baseline, and under Cases 2 and 4.
2.48 experience a decline in their benefits, whereas households with ϕ = 1 and
6.79 experience an increase. However, accounting for the improvements in health
leads to benefits declining by a smaller extent relative to Case 2. For example,
benefits decline only by about 11% for the households at the bottom of the income
distribution under Case 4, compared to almost 15% under Case 2. This decline in
Social Security benefits, which is the largest under Case 4, is only half of the decline
under Case 1 (23%).
Social Security benefits decline by a smaller percentage under Case 4 because
households delay collection even further in this experiment. I report the fraction of
households collecting Social Security benefits under Case 3 as a function of age in
Figure 19. The figure shows that until age 68, the fraction of households collecting
Social Security benefits stays stable at about 22% under Case 4. This is about half
of that under Case 2, where the fraction collecting at age 68 is about 46%. However,
between ages 68 and 69, the fraction of households collecting increases rapidly to
100. Decomposing by household type, those with ϕ = 0.15 delay collection by one
year, those with ϕ = 0.4 by two years, those with ϕ = 1 by four years, and those
with ϕ = 6.79 by seven years, relative to the baseline. The delayed retirement
credits associated with these delays in collection cause the benefits to decline by a
smaller percentage under Case 4.
To summarize, I find that while accounting for the improvements in health as-
sociated with the longevity improvements has roughly the same effect on Social
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Security’s tax base, the effect on benefits is slightly different. Benefits generally
decline by a smaller percentage when the health improvements are accounted for,
because households delay collection even further under this experiment.
10 Conclusions
The SSA’s actuarial projections overestimate the Social Security crisis because they
ignore the household-level and macroeconomic adjustments associated with improve-
ments in longevity. In this paper, I show that accounting for these adjustments, a
significantly smaller decline in benefits is needed to balance the Social Security bud-
get. This is because households respond to a higher life expectancy by delaying
retirement and Social Security benefit collection, working more hours, and by also
saving more. In general equilibrium, these effects increase the aggregate labor sup-
ply, and also the capital stock and the wage rate. Collectively, these changes lead
to a natural expansion of Social Security’s tax base, and also generate significant
delayed retirement credits, which the actuarial estimates completely overlook.
The future insolvency of Social Security in the U.S. has generated a lot of re-
search on how the program can be reformed to be fiscally sustainable, while also
providing much of the benefits that it currently provides to the general population.
The mechanisms that I consider in this paper are a part of virtually every single
macroeconomic model that has been used to evaluate such reform policies. My find-
ings in this paper make a strong case in favor of including these very mechanisms
in the statistics routinely used to measure the health of Social Security.
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